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A B S T R A C T
The Convention on the Future of Europe that led to the even-
tual drafting of an EU Constitution involved numerous politi-
cal actors from many countries. Their negotiations over the
constitution generated a huge volume of texts containing
substantive information about their preferences for EU insti-
tutional and political outcomes. In this paper, we attempt to
measure these preferences at the national party level by
analysing the Convention texts using the computerized
‘word-scoring’ method for text analysis (Laver et al., 2003).
For each national party whose delegates’ texts were
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recorded at the Convention, we estimate their positions on four political dimensions.
We then test the validity of these estimates by comparing them with measures of
national party positions on EU policy dimensions obtained through an extensive
expert survey undertaken in 27 countries (the EU 25 plus Turkey and Romania). Our
results show strong evidence that the word-scoring method is broadly successful in
reconstructing the map of national party preferences for and against a more central-
ized and more powerful Europe as expressed through the Convention texts.
Introduction
The Convention on the Future of Europe, held in Laeken to negotiate and
eventually draft a constitution for the European Union (EU), involved politi-
cal actors from many countries, national parties, European Parliament party
groups and representatives of interest groups. Each actor held preferences
towards the negotiation outcomes, which they presumably pursued by articu-
lating their positions during the Convention. Measuring these preferences is
of high relevance both for political science in general terms and for estimat-
ing the course and determinants of European integration more specifically.
Fortunately, Convention participants left a written record of their negotia-
tions, articulating these in a manner that was meticulously recorded. Because
of the vast quantity of these texts, however – involving a total of 6474 contri-
butions from 197 distinct speakers from 28 different countries – it is time-
consuming, costly and difficult to extract useful information from these
documents. Recent methodological advances in computerized content
analysis, however, offer new ways to deal with such huge volumes of text.
The recently developed computerized word-scoring technique (Laver et al.,
2003) is one such method, and has already been applied to the analysis of
party manifestos (Laver et al., 2003; Benoit and Laver, 2003) and parlia-
mentary speeches (Laver and Benoit, 2002; Giannetti and Laver, forthcom-
ing). Driven by relative word frequencies, the word-scoring method breaks
down each text into words, treating these words as data to be analysed statis-
tically. Such techniques offer particularly large payoffs when the research task
involves analysing very large numbers of texts in a systematic way, as is
precisely the case in relation to negotiations during the Laeken Convention.
In this article we apply the word-scoring method to analyse the thou-
sands of Convention texts, with the goal of estimating the political positions
of national party representatives participating in the Convention. In order to
assess the validity of the word-score estimates, we compare national party
word-score estimates from the Laeken negotiations with expert survey scores
of European national parties from the 2003 expert survey reported in Benoit
European Union Politics 6(3)2 9 2
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and Laver (forthcoming). The exercise thus serves as a good test for word-
scoring in a substantive application where the sheer volume of texts makes
other methods of text analysis impossible or infeasible. Our measure of
success will be the degree of statistical correlation we can observe between
the word-score estimates and the independent expert survey estimates of the
positions of national parties on the same policy dimensions.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we briefly describe the nature of the
Convention on the Future of Europe and the negotiation process on the EU
Constitution for which we seek to measure actor preferences. We also set forth
our basic theoretical assumptions, namely that actors hold and pursue politi-
cal outcome preferences that they articulate through negotiations, and that
these preferences will be manifest in their negotiating texts. Second, we
describe our data, consisting of the Convention texts and the set of expert
survey estimates of party positions used to validate the word-score estimates.
Third, we briefly describe the computerized word-scoring methodology, and
present in detail how it was applied to the Convention texts. Next, we present
and discuss the results of the word-scoring and compare them with the set
of expert survey estimates. Finally, we discuss the overall achievements of
this research and draw conclusions for our ability to measure political actor
preferences from their texts.
The Convention on the Future of Europe
During the Intergovernmental Conference held in Nice in 2000, the need was
recognized to address substantial EU institutional and constitutional matters
that were considered to have been left over from previous rounds of Treaty
reform. In a ‘Declaration on the Future of Europe’, annexed as Declaration
No. 23 to the Treaty of Nice (2001), EU member states agreed to initiate a
deeper and wider debate within Europe. At an informal meeting of the
European Council in Ghent in October 2001, general guidelines were agreed
for the establishment of a Convention that would foster a constitutional
debate on the future of the EU.
The momentum for a constitutional Convention continued in December
2001, when the European Council in Laeken laid out more precisely not only
the goals and the objectives of such a Convention, but also the procedural
details of when it should convene and how it should be constituted.
According to the Laeken Declaration (2001), the following key issues were
expected to be discussed during the Convention: the division of competences
between the Union and its member states, the simplification of the Union’s
legislative instruments, the maintenance of the inter-institutional balance, an
Benoit, Laver, Arnold, Pennings and Hosli Measuring National Delegate Positions 2 9 3
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improvement to the efficacy of the decision-making procedures, the definition
of the EU’s role in an increasingly global environment, and the constitution-
alization of the Treaties.
The European Council at Laeken appointed Valéry Giscard d’Estaing as
chairman of the Convention, and Giuliano Amato and Jean-Luc Dehaene as
vice-chairmen. Additionally, the Convention was constituted by the follow-
ing members: 15 representatives of the heads of state or government (one
from each member state), 30 representatives of the national parliaments of
the member states (two from each member state), 16 members of the European
Parliament (EP), 2 representatives of the European Commission, 13 govern-
ment representatives of the accession and candidate countries (one from each
country) and 26 representatives of the national parliaments of the accession
and candidate countries (two from each country). Participating as observers
were 3 representatives of the Economic and Social Committee, 6 representa-
tives of the Committee of the Regions, 3 representatives of the social partners,
and 1 person representing the European Ombudsman. In addition to the 105
full members, each member of the Convention, with the exception of the three
chairmen, was allowed to appoint one alternate, bringing the total number
of members to 204. Furthermore, during the course of the deliberations, many
governments replaced previously appointed members with new ones,
bringing the total number of members participating in the Convention at one
point or another to a total of 275. These members collectively produced a
substantive record of the contentious deliberations during the Convention in
the form of documents, amendments and speeches, which were all made
available publicly.
Underlying our attempt to estimate the policy preferences of Convention
participants is not only the fact that actors’ positions are recorded in the
publicly available texts, but also the expectation that these texts will contain
information about the sincere policy preferences of national political actors.
Existing research on cleavage theory supports the idea that policy differences
will divide parties not just at the national level, but also at the European level
(Marks and Wilson, 2000; Hooghe et al., 2002; Gabel and Hix, 2002; Pennings,
2002; Thomson et al., 2004). As the fundamental issues of the Convention
dealt with the institutions of Europe, furthermore, we expect that different
national party stances regarding the strength and scope of European powers
will be directly reflected in national position-taking at the Convention
(Pennings et al., 2004). We also expect, although possibly to a lesser extent,
general left–right policy differences to be evident in Convention texts.
Existing theories indicate that, when actors evaluate their preferences on
formal rules to be incorporated into a constitution, they do so by calculating
the extent to which these will favour or hamper the realization of their most
European Union Politics 6(3)2 9 4
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preferred policy goals (Collignon, 2003). We therefore expect a correspon-
dence between independently measured positions of national political parties
on European and general left–right issues and positions taken at the Conven-
tion. The test applied here is whether the computerized content method of
word-scoring can reliably extract this correspondence from the body of texts
produced during the Convention.
Data
Convention texts
The data used in this paper come from two principal sources. The first is the
set of Convention texts, which were made publicly available on the official
Convention website (http://european-convention.eu.int). We were able to
access all the documents that were submitted by the Convention participants.1
Since the Convention completed its work on 10 July 2003, we harvested the
full set of the documents in September 2003 to make sure that our database
could be presumed to be complete. As might be expected, the corpus of docu-
ments collected required cleaning up before it could be used. First, the names
of the actors came in many variations, partly because of alternative spellings,
differences in electronic character sets and national conventions. We wrote a
canonicalization procedure which used disambiguating heuristics to match
the 1018 name variations found in the database to the 275 known actors. From
the same website, we also obtained information on the actors’ nationalities
and their national party affiliations. Of the total of 275 actors, we were able
to match 197 to a national party. The remaining actors mostly either belonged
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or were members of the diplomatic corps.
Second, in the meta-information in the Convention database, the
language of the document was more often than not identified incorrectly.
Therefore, we ignored the information about the language contained in the
original database and instead used ‘TextCat’: an n-gram-based language
identification tool that uses rank-order statistics to compare the prevalence of
short letter sequences (Cavnar and Trenkle, 1994; Dunning, 1994; Sibun and
Reynar, 1996).2 This helped us to discover that the 6474 texts came in seven
different languages (English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese
and Dutch; see Table 1). Because a clear majority of texts (60%) were in
English, our analysis began by selecting only the 3893 English texts for further
processing. This selection process was necessary because the word-scores
method requires that all texts being analysed come from the same lexical
universe, which means they must all be in the same language. In appendix A3
Benoit, Laver, Arnold, Pennings and Hosli Measuring National Delegate Positions 2 9 5
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we present evidence that the sample of authors providing English, single-
authored texts does not contain actors whose positions differ substantially
from those in the entire collection of texts.
Concatenations of these files by national party were then processed for
use by word scores. We concatenated the files because we view the natural
text unit for analysis as being all of the text submitted by particular national
party speakers, and we expect all of the speeches to represent a particular
political viewpoint at the Convention.4 Another choice to be made concerned
how to handle texts submitted to the Convention by multiple authors. As can
be seen in Table 2, of the English-language texts, some 64% were single-
authored, with the rest being handed in by two authors or more. For simplic-
ity, we selected the 2493 single-authored texts for further analysis.
The texts came in six basic variations, as can be seen in Table 3. Substan-
tively, the most important type was amendments, and these also represent
European Union Politics 6(3)2 9 6
Table 1 Texts by language
Language Number of texts %
Dutch 14 0.22
English 3893 60.11
French 1425 22.01
German 719 11.11
Italian 190 2.93
Portuguese 115 1.78
Spanish 118 1.82
Total 6474 100.00
Table 2 Authorship of English-language texts
Number of authors Number of texts %
1 2493 64.04
2 437 11.23
3 120 3.08
4 223 5.73
5 127 3.26
6 216 5.55
> 6 277 7.11
Total 3893 100.00
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the vast majority of documents submitted. In fact, the total of 2136 proposed
amendments represent almost 86% of all English-language texts submitted by
a single author. Given the fact that the overarching rationale for the Conven-
tion was to simplify and to constitutionalize the Treaties, it is not surprising
that we should find that member states frequently, and strategically, made
use of suggested amendments to express their policy preferences. Many of
the amendments, in fact, had a fair amount of original text added by the actor
submitting the document, in which a detailed explanation was given of why
a certain Treaty article needed to be changed. Additional types of documents
submitted to the Convention were ‘contributions’ (186) and ‘speeches’ (138).
Together, these two categories represent 13% of all English-language docu-
ments submitted by a single author.
Expert surveys
As a set of external reference points for the policy positions of the national
parties whose Convention texts we examine in this paper, we use an expert
survey of party policy positions conducted by Kenneth Benoit and Michael
Laver in 2003. This survey, reported in Benoit and Laver (forthcoming),
extended the Laver–Hunt (1992) expert survey methodology to all of the 25
EU member states. In each of the countries surveyed, respondents were sent
(by regular post or by e-mail) a questionnaire on the main political parties in
their country, plus a list of approximately 12 policy dimensions on which they
were asked to locate these parties. Respondents consisted of academic politi-
cal experts, selected in each country from lists provided by national political
science associations. In an effort to reach more respondents, Benoit and Laver
translated the survey (originally in English) into the native language of 16 of
Benoit, Laver, Arnold, Pennings and Hosli Measuring National Delegate Positions 2 9 7
Table 3 Text type for English, single-authored texts
Text type Frequency %
Proposed amendments 2136 85.8
Contributions 186 7.5
Speeches 138 5.5
Documents 17 0.7
Press and information 10 0.4
Related documents 3 0.1
Other 3 0.1
Total 2493 100.00
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the 25 EU countries, resulting in native languages (including English) being
used in 18 of the 25 countries. Details on response rates and question items
are provided in appendix A to this paper, as well as being described in full
in Benoit and Laver (forthcoming).
The expert surveys characterized policy dimensions a priori, and asked
respondents to locate political parties on a scale ranging from one extreme of
this dimension to the other. Following the Laver–Hunt methodology, the
Benoit–Laver expert survey used 1 to 20 point scales, where 1 generally corre-
sponds to the ‘left’ position and 20 to the ‘right’. In the context of the EU, 1
meant a pro-EU stance and 20 meant an anti-EU position. For this paper, we
have relied mainly on a subset of these questions that relate specifically to
the EU. These questions were the following:
EU Accountability
Promotes the direct accountability of the EU to citizens via institutions such as
the European Parliament. (1)
Promotes the indirect accountability of the EU to citizens via their own national
governments. (20)
EU Authority5
Favours increasing the range of areas in which the EU can set policy. (1)
Favours reducing the range of areas in which the EU can set policy. (20)
EU Security
Favours <Country> involvement in European security and peacekeeping
missions. (1)
Opposes any <Country> involvement in European military affairs. (20)
The expert survey also included a direct measure of left–right positioning,
asking experts to locate parties on a general left–right scale as well as on a
set of substantive policy scales. After providing an average of 10 other policy
dimensions per country, the questionnaire further asked:
Left–Right
Please locate each party on a general left–right dimension, taking all aspects of
party policy into account. Left (1). Right (20).
In what follows we will use the estimates of national party positions from
these dimensions to provide an external validity check on the results of
computerized word-scoring of each national party’s Convention texts. If we
can demonstrate a positive and significant correlation between the word-score
estimates of a party’s Convention position and the estimates of that national
European Union Politics 6(3)2 9 8
03_benoit_054834 (jk-t)  13/7/05  2:15 pm  Page 298
party’s policy position from the completely independent expert survey, then
this will be evidence that word scores can be successfully applied to measure
the positions of political actors in forums such as the Convention on the
Future of Europe.
Methodology: Computerized word-scoring
Having identified the Convention texts we will analyse here, we now set out
to estimate the policy positions of the authors who wrote them. To do this,
we analyse the texts using the computerized ‘word-scoring’ technique set out
in Laver et al. (2003), which contains a full description of what is involved,
together with web links to downloadable software that will perform all of the
data analysis required.6 Briefly, the word-scoring technique is a method for
estimating the position of ‘virgin’ (unknown) texts on a priori policy dimen-
sions. Essentially, it does this by statistically comparing the patterns of word
frequencies in the virgin texts under investigation with the patterns of word
frequencies in a set of ‘reference’ texts from well-known sources. Once the
analyst has access to external estimates of the positions of the reference texts
on the a priori dimensions under investigation, as we have with our expert
survey findings, or indeed is confident in being able to assume these, the
word-scoring technique proceeds as follows.
First, the reference texts are analysed in order to calculate a matrix of the
relative frequencies of all words in the word universe of the set of reference
texts. This in turn allows the calculation of a matrix of key conditional prob-
abilities, each element of which is the probability that a reader is reading refer-
ence text r given that he or she is reading word w. For any given a priori
policy dimension for which the positions of the authors of each reference text
can be either estimated or confidently assumed, this allows the calculation of
a vector of ‘word scores’, each element of which is in effect an estimated policy
position of text r, given that the reader is reading word w. The vector of word
scores for any a priori policy dimension is thus a function of the policy posi-
tions and the patterns of relative word frequencies in the set of reference texts.
Having calculated the vector of word scores for a given dimension from the
reference texts, the analyst is now in a position to investigate ‘virgin’ texts,
where no information whatsoever is available about the policy positions
expressed in them. This is very simply achieved. The pattern of relative word
frequencies in each virgin text is observed and this, combined with the vector
of word scores for the dimension under investigation, allows the analyst to
estimate the position of each virgin text on this dimension.
Because this technique is purely statistical, it has three great advantages
Benoit, Laver, Arnold, Pennings and Hosli Measuring National Delegate Positions 2 9 9
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over more traditional methods of text analysis. It requires no substantive
judgement calls during the process of data analysis and is thus perfectly
replicable; it operates in any language, not needing predefined coding diction-
aries; and it generates an estimate of the uncertainty associated with any
estimated policy position. The analyst’s crucial expert role when using the
word-scoring technique is at the research design stage – in identifying appro-
priate reference texts and in picking good estimates or assumptions about the
positions of these texts on the a priori dimensions under investigation. If the
reference texts are inappropriate or if their estimated or assumed policy posi-
tions are misleading, then this will produce misleading estimates of the posi-
tions of the virgin texts. The key, therefore, is to build on a solid foundation
of well-chosen reference texts, with solid estimates or assumptions about
policy positions.
Our selection of reference texts involves identifying a set of extreme pro-
EU texts on the one hand, and a set of extreme anti-EU texts, on the other.
Since our unit of estimation will be national political parties, we can use the
Benoit and Laver (forthcoming) expert survey results to identify extreme
parties on the four policy dimensions. Our method was therefore kept delib-
erately simple and data driven. For each dimension under investigation, a
cluster of parties occupying the extreme positions on the expert survey
dimensions was identified by using the 10th and 90th percentiles of dimen-
sion scores as cut-offs. On the a priori scale of 1 to 20, going from pro- to anti-
EU, any text associated with a national political party scoring in the 10th or
lower percentile of ‘extremism’ was used to create the pro-EU reference text.
Likewise, any text associated with a national political party scoring in the
90th or higher percentile of extremism was used to create the anti-EU refer-
ence text. All such texts were concatenated into two sets of reference texts:
one representing a pro-EU position and one representing an anti-EU position.7
For each of our policy dimensions examined, appendix C of this paper
provides full details on which speakers, parties and countries provided the
texts to create these ‘extreme’ reference texts.
Reference texts were assigned scores on a metric of –1.0 to +1.0, with the
pro-EU reference text receiving the –1.0 score, and the anti-EU text receiving
+1.0. We then scored the words for each of the policy dimensions under
investigation using the different reference texts.8 We created two sets of scored
words for each of these: one using the pair of concatenated reference texts
(one on each extreme) consisting of amendments, and another pair of refer-
ence texts consisting of other (non-amendment) text types. Following the
creation of the word scores, we then applied this to virgin texts contributed
by national parties, paired similarly into amendment and non-amendment
texts. Virgin texts consisted of concatenated texts of all speakers representing
European Union Politics 6(3)3 0 0
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the same national political party. For example, for the EU Authority Dimen-
sion, there were three different speakers from the UK Conservative Party:
Heathcoat-Amory, Kirkhope and Stockton (see appendix C). These speakers’
texts were concatenated into two sets of texts to be scored, depending on text
type: respectively 76, 134 and 65 proposed amendments from the three
speakers were used to create a single concatenated text for the UK Conserv-
ative Party for amendments, and the respectively 6, 3 and 3 other types of
text were used to create the ‘other’ text type of concatenated text.9 Because
of the possible concerns about different text types providing different lexical
orientations, we separated virgin texts into two types: proposed amendments
and all other texts. As stated previously, we expect amendments to contain
more directed information about actors’ policy preferences, given their
focused purpose and more standard content relative to the much looser possi-
bilities for other text types, which included contributions, speeches, press
releases and miscellaneous other documents.
Our final step was then to compare the scalar estimates for each virgin
text with the expert survey means for each national party, analysing amend-
ments and other text types separately. We used both graphical and statistical
methods for this evaluation, with statistics being simple OLS regression
analysis. We do not expect to predict party scores perfectly – for a number of
reasons – but we consider it a success for the word-scores technique if we
observe a statistically significant, positive correlation between the word-score
estimates and the expert survey estimates. In addition to cross-national tests
comparing word-scores and expert survey estimates for all national parties,
we also compared word-scores and expert survey rankings within each
country.
Results
Pooled comparisons
If word scores can correctly identify the positions of national political parties
as recorded in their Convention texts, then we would expect word-score esti-
mates of national party texts to show a significant, positive relationship with
the expert survey estimates that provide external and independent measure-
ment of national party positions. Our first test thus pooled all national parties
and examined cross-national correlations between the word-score and expert
survey estimates. Figures 1–4 portray the associations for each of our four
policy dimensions: EU Accountability, EU Authority, EU Security and general
Left–Right preferences for socioeconomic policy. In each graph, the expert
Benoit, Laver, Arnold, Pennings and Hosli Measuring National Delegate Positions 3 0 1
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Figure 1 Raw word-score estimates compared with expert survey estimates for
national parties: EU Accountability dimension.
Note: Extremism is 10th, 90th percentile, 200-word minimum. The party names and abbreviations
are listed at URL: http://www.politics.tcd.ie/ppmd/.
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Figure 3 Raw word-score estimates compared with expert survey estimates for
national parties: EU Security dimension.
Note: Extremism is 10th, 90th percentile, 200-word minimum.
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Figure 4 Raw word-score estimates compared with expert survey estimates for
national parties: Left–Right dimension.
Note: Extremism is 10th, 90th percentile, 200-word minimum.
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Table 4 Regressions of raw word-score estimates on expert survey positions of national parties
Text type
Indep. variable Amendments Other Amendments Other Amendments Other Amendments Other
Accountability .0207 .0124
(.0037) (.0028)
Authority .0207 .0092
(.0037) (.0023)
Security .0151 .0151
(.0021) (.0031)
Left–Right .0168 .0168
(.0030) (.0034)
Constant –.1883 –.1212 –.1877 –.1015 –.1187 –.1578 –.1940 –.2132
(.0124) (.0289) (.0370) (.0234) (.0201) (.0252) (.0343) (.0396)
Adj R2 .47 .34 .44 .27 .56 .37 .36 .32
Root MSE .0765 .0572 .0837 .0498 .0497 .0506 .0940 .0959
N 36 36 40 42 40 39 55 51
Note: All coefficients are statistically significant at the p < .001 level. Standard errors in parentheses.
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survey estimates (ranging from 1 to 20) are plotted against the raw word-
score estimates, set originally in a (–1, 1) interval, but bunched more narrowly
towards an interval of approximately (–0.5, 0.5) because of overlapping
words. The solid line in each plot shows the (OLS) linear relationship, and
the shaded region depicts the associated 95% confidence interval.
We see immediately from Figures 1–4 that in each case there is indeed a
positive and significant relationship between the national party texts and the
associated word scores. The panel on the left shows the results for amend-
ment texts, and the panel on the right for all other texts. In the case of the
three EU policy dimensions, our expectation that amendment texts would
show a better word-scores fit is confirmed, whereas the linear-fitting models
for the Left–Right dimension are essentially the same between amendments
and other text types. The poorer fit of the Left–Right word scores to the expert
survey estimates (Figure 4) also suggests that there is less direct information
about this policy dimension in the Convention texts than exists for EU-related
policy.
The linear fits and confidence regions suggest a strong association
between the virgin text scores and the quite independent expert survey esti-
mates of the positions of the authors of the virgin texts, something we can
examine further by looking at the OLS regression results presented for each
dimension in Table 4. From this table we see numerical versions of the
relationships portrayed in Figures 1–4. All coefficients are positive and statis-
tically significant, with the strongest coefficient estimates coming from the
amendment texts for the EU Security and EU Accountability questions, both
estimated at .0207. This coefficient means that a movement from the minimum
to the maximum of the expert survey scale – from 1 to 20 – is associated with
a .41 change in the word-score value, which is a substantively significant shift
considering the range for all word-scores estimates is within the (–0.45, 0.45)
interval. The overall fit of each model as measured by the R2 values for each
dimension is also remarkably high, ranging from .56 for amendment texts on
the EU Security dimension, to .47 and .44 for EU Accountability and EU
Authority respectively. As expected, the linear-fitting models for proposed
amendment texts were better than for other text types for every EU dimen-
sion.
Word-score estimates for Left–Right positions also show a positive, statis-
tically significant relationship, although the slopes were of a lower magni-
tude (.0168 for both text types) than for the typical corresponding EU
dimension. Linear fit as measured by the R2 values was also typically lower,
with expert survey values explaining only about 36% and 32% of the vari-
ation in word-score estimates for amendments and other text types, respec-
tively. This suggests either less information about Left–Right policy positions
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Table 5 Summary of within-country word-scores results: Rank-order correlations of word-scores rankings versus expert survey rankings
within countries
EU Accountability EU Authority EU Security Left–Right
Spearman's R Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
Amendments
–1.00– –0.50 1 10.0 1 7.7 3 25.0
–0.50–0.00 1 6.3
0.00–0.25
0.25–0.50 1 6.3
0.50–0.75 2 20.0 2 15.4 3 25.0 3 18.8
0.75–0.95 3 30.0 3 23.1 2 16.7 2 12.5
1.00 4 40.0 7 53.9 4 33.3 9 56.3
Total countries 10 13 12 16
Country median rho 0.85 1.00 0.75 1.00
Mean parties compared 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.0
Other texts
–1.00– –0.50 2 18.2 3 23.1 1 8.3 5 31.3
–0.50–0.00 2 18.2 2 16.7
0.00–0.25 1 7.7 1 6.3
0.25–0.50
0.50–0.75 1 9.1 2 15.4 2 16.7 4 25.0
0.75–0.95 0 0 1 7.7 2 16.7 1 6.3
1.00 6 54.6 6 46.2 5 41.7 5 31.3
Total countries 11 13 12 16
Country median rho 1.00 0.80 0.85 0.50
Mean parties compared 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.8
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in the Convention texts, or alternatively that national party positions on
substantive policy matters may be somehow modified when represented in
supranational bodies. The latter possibility is something we return to briefly
in our concluding remarks.
Our overall assessment of these results is positive: the strong statistical
associations between the word-score estimates of Convention texts and
completely independent expert survey estimates of national party policy posi-
tions serve as compelling evidence that, on the whole, the computerized
word-scoring method has the ability to measure policy positions of political
actors in a cross-national context. For the most part in discussions on the
future EU Constitution, representatives of national political parties held pref-
erences very similar to those one would expect them to hold based on their
policy stances expressed in the national context. There are, however, some
notable outliers, which it would be interesting to investigate further. For
instance, in the case of the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism) in Germany,
the party was able to send only one representative, namely Yvonne
Kaufmann. It would perhaps be instructive to explore the political substance
behind these outliers by looking into the type of working group in which each
delegate chose to be particularly active.
Within-country comparisons
Since estimates of party policy positions may not necessarily be directly
comparable across different national contexts, we have also compared within-
country rankings of the two independent estimates. For each country, we
compared the ranking from pro- to anti-EU (or left to right) for the parties
for which both word-scores and expert survey estimates existed, and
summarized the correspondence in rankings using Spearman’s rho, the
ordinal equivalent of Pearson’s R and, like Pearson’s coefficient, ranging from
–1.0 to +1.0.
Table 5 summarizes the results of the within-country rank associations.
For each dimension analysed in this paper, we have provided a frequency
distribution for ranges of Spearman’s coefficient, listing the number of
countries scoring in this ranking. The total number of countries compared
indicates how many different countries were involved in the overall
frequency breakdown, ranging from 16 countries for the Left–Right dimen-
sion to 10 for EU Accountability. The country median rho reports the median
Spearman coefficient for the countries compared, indicating the typical value.
For amendment texts, these values were exceptionally high, ranging from 1.0
for EU Authority and the Left–Right scores, to 0.85 and 0.75 for EU Account-
ability and EU Security, respectively. This indicates that the typical ranking
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of national party amendment texts by word scores and by the expert surveys
is correlated between 0.75 and perfectly, depending on the policy dimension.
Similar median correlations for the other text types were also high, ranging
from 0.50 for the Left–Right dimension to 1.0 for EU Accountability.
Of course, different numbers of parties were being compared in different
countries, and this affects the probability of rank correspondence occurring
by chance.10 To provide a sense of the number of parties being compared, we
report the mean number of parties used for comparison. In most countries,
about 3 parties were compared, with a range of 2 to 5 parties.
Our strong results here on the correspondence of intra-country party
rankings generated by word scores and independent expert surveys reinforce
our findings from the cross-national comparison. It is also remarkable that
the median Spearman coefficient for 16 country rankings compared for the
Left–Right dimension was (for amendments) 1.0, indicating a high degree of
correspondence in the word scores and expert survey rankings of this
substantive policy dimension. Overall, word scores provide a remarkably
accurate way to reproduce national country rankings from pro- to anti-EU
and from left to right, as compared with and validated by external and inde-
pendent expert survey estimates.
Conclusion
Substantively, the Laeken process that led to a draft EU Constitution is of
considerable importance for the EU’s future development. A large and
diverse set of actors, from many different countries and starting with a varied
set of policy preferences, came together to negotiate a common document.
Many of these actors left traces on the historical record, in the form of texts
that were input into the negotiation process, and that we can take to contain
information about their policy preferences. Analysing this complex body of
texts in a systematic way presents some formidable methodological chal-
lenges. It is to these challenges that this paper has been addressed. The hope
is that, if we can find appropriate techniques for analysing these texts, then
we can find systematic ways to interrogate this potentially very valuable data
source about the preferences of the actors involved in negotiating the future
of Europe. Statistical techniques of computerized content analysis such as
word scores offer particularly large payoffs when the research task involves
analysing very large numbers of texts in a systematic way, as is precisely the
case in relation to negotiations during the Laeken Convention.
This article thus sought to investigate the potential of computerized
word-scoring in analysing the large number of texts associated with this
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complex international negotiation. As a methodological contribution, our
paper set out to explore whether the initial positive evaluations of comput-
erized word-scoring could be replicated in the context of international nego-
tiations. The results are resoundingly positive, and suggest not only that
extraordinary gains in terms of time, effort and expense are possible using
the word-scoring method of computerized content analysis, but also that this
method is capable of extracting valid measures from negotiating texts such
as those generated from the Laeken Convention.
As a substantive contribution, our analysis explored whether systematic
order could be brought to the empirical analysis of the diverse set of Laeken
texts. The acid test in all of this was to see whether computerized word-
scoring of the Laeken Convention texts could replicate the judgements of
country specialists in relation to national party positions on four key policy
dimensions – three related specifically to the EU (on accountability, author-
ity and security) and a more general left–right dimension. Our analysis in this
paper suggests that information on the policy preferences of the authors of
the Convention texts, retrieved using computerized word-scoring, can be
cross-validated against information on the policy positions of the same
authors as estimated using independent expert surveys. In general cross-
national comparisons, strong positive results were observed for word scores,
particularly when analysing proposed amendments, with independently
measured expert survey scores explaining between 44% and 56% of the
variance in the word-score estimates for the EU dimensions of policy.
Our results clearly show that word-scoring of the Laeken documents was
able to retrieve the left–right positioning of national political parties, although
with greater prediction error than for their policy positions on various aspects
of the EU. Expert survey estimates of left–right positioning explained only
36% of the variation in word-score estimates (for amendment text types). This
suggests two possibilities. One is that the Convention texts lacked sufficient
textual information about left–right policy positions of the parties – because
the negotiations concerned matters that were not systematically structured in
left–right terms. The other is that the parties revealed their ‘true’ preferences
on the EU in the Laeken amendments that they proposed but did not reveal
their left–right positions in such a systematic way – or indeed felt differently
about left and right in the EU context.
The core purpose of the present paper has been methodological, its aim
being to assess the value of computerized word-scoring in this complex and
data-rich international context. If we accept that word-scoring does have some
value in this context, then the way opens up for it to put to substantive use.
It also suggests the strong future gains to be realized through applying
computerized content analysis techniques such as word scores to fields where
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traditional hand-coded content analysis is infeasible and unreliable. For
example, word scores could be used to trace potential movements of the
policy positions of particular actors during the course of the negotiations,
testing the conjecture that these positions moved closer together as the actors
moved towards agreeing a common text. Alternatively, they could be used,
within individual countries, to estimate the policy positions of non-party
political actors, such as trade unions and interest groups, whose policy texts
could be treated as virgin texts and scored on the same policy dimensions as
part of an exploration of domestic constraints on the international bargain-
ing process. Our initial findings are encouraging and suggest that such appli-
cations could indeed be attempted in the expectation of valid results.
Notes
This research was supported by the European Commission Fifth Framework
(project number SERD-2002–00061) and by the Institute for International Integra-
tion Studies, Trinity College, Dublin. We thank Ben Crum for his advice on the
positions taken by Convention delegates, and Christian Grose, Gail McElroy and
two anonymous reviewers for comments.
1 To ‘spider’ automatically through the Convention website and to harvest all
the documents with the corresponding meta-information, we wrote
customized scripts in the computer language Perl.
2 We converted all the documents to ISO-8859–1/ASCII using ‘pdftotext’ in a
Linux environment and ran the language identification tool through all of
them.
3 The Appendices can be found on the EUP webpage. As indicated by Table
1, the largest non-English text set was in French. These texts tended to come
primarily from Belgian and French sources, although Belgian and French
sources also recorded substantial English-language texts: 273 English versus
985 French texts for France, and 303 English texts versus 1001 French texts
for Belgium.
4 It would of course be possible to analyse each text separately, to see (for
instance) whether national party positions changed over time as the Conven-
tion proceeded. This analysis would be significantly more complex than the
one attempted here, however, given the thousands of texts involved. Many
individual texts are also too short to permit reliable analysis.
5 Two closely related questions were also coded as EU Authority: (Ireland only)
Favours a more powerful and centralized EU (1). Opposes a more powerful
and centralized EU (20). (France only) Opposes an expanded and stronger
EU (1). Favours an expanded and stronger EU (20).
6 A full replication data set for this paper, including log files with full results
of the word-scoring, is available from URL: http://www.politics.tcd.ie/
wordscores/Laeken.html.
7 In fact, two reference texts were created for each extreme, one for proposed
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amendments and one for all other text types. Both text types were given iden-
tical reference scores.
8 One difference between the analysis of the EU dimensions and the usual
Left–Right dimension is that expert survey estimates for the EU dimensions
were available only for the 15 EU member states existing prior to 1 May 2004.
The 10 accession countries were asked only a question about EU joining, and
this question was not posed to the experts from 15 non-accession states.
Because the accession states provided relatively few texts, there is not
sufficient variation or information about EU accession to support a word-
scores analysis of that dimension on the basis of the Convention documents.
9 Because the UK Conservative Party was also identified as an anti-EU refer-
ence party for this dimension (see appendix C), these two concatenated texts
for the UK Conservative Party were also used in creating the anti-EU refer-
ence texts (one for amendments and one for other text types) for the EU
Authority dimension. The choice to analyse reference texts individually again
as virgin texts allows us to place reference text parties relative to other virgin
text parties. Because raw virgin text scores are computed independently from
one another, the decision to include reference texts in no way affects the esti-
mates for non-reference virgin text parties.
10 For instance, two rankings of a pair of parties have a .5 probability of perfect
correspondence by chance. The number of parties compared in each country
mainly differs widely because, for each dimension and each text type, differ-
ent parties had both submitted texts and been scored on the expert survey
dimensions.
References
Benoit, Kenneth and Michael Laver (2003) ‘Estimating Irish Party Policy Positions
Using Computer Wordscoring: The 2002 Election’, Irish Political Studies 18(1):
97–107.
Benoit, Kenneth and Michael Laver (2005) Party Policy in Modern Democracies.
London: Routledge (forthcoming).
Cavnar, William B. and John M. Trenkle (1994) ‘N-Gram-Based Text Categoriz-
ation’, in Proceedings of Third Annual Symposium on Document Analysis and Infor-
mation Retrieval, Las Vegas, NV, UNLV Publications/Reprographics, pp. 161–75,
11–13 April 1994.
Collignon, S. (2003) The European Republic: Reflections on the Economy of a Future
Constitution. London: Federal Trust for Education and Research/Bertelsmann
Foundation.
Dunning, Ted (1994) ‘Statistical Identification of Language’, CRL Technical Report
MCCS, 94–273, New Mexico State University.
Gabel, Matthew and Simon Hix (2002) ‘Defining the EU Political Space’, Compar-
ative Political Studies 35(8): 934–64.
Giannetti, Daniela and Michael Laver (forthcoming) ‘Policy Positions and Jobs in
the Government’, European Journal of Political Research.
Hooghe, Lisbet, Gary Marks and Carole J. Wilson (2002) ‘Does Left/Right
Benoit, Laver, Arnold, Pennings and Hosli Measuring National Delegate Positions 3 1 1
03_benoit_054834 (jk-t)  13/7/05  2:15 pm  Page 311
Structure Party Positions on European Integration?’, Comparative Political
Studies 35(8): 965–89.
Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union (2001) in Presidency
Conclusions of the Laeken European Council (14 and 15 December 2001),
Annex I, Bulletin of the European Union, No. 12, pp. 19–23.
Laver, Michael and Kenneth Benoit (2002) ‘Locating TDs in Policy Spaces Using
Computer Word-Scoring’, Irish Political Studies 17(1): 59–72.
Laver, Michael and Ben Hunt (1992) Party and Policy Competition. London:
Routledge.
Laver, Michael, Kenneth Benoit and John Garry (2003) ‘Extracting Policy Positions
from Political Texts Using Words as Data’, American Political Science Review
97(2): 311–31.
Marks, Gary and Carole J. Wilson (2000) ‘The Past in the Present: A Cleavage
Theory of Party Response to European Integration’, British Journal of Political
Science 30: 433–59.
Pennings, Paul, Madeleine O. Hosli and Christine Arnold (2004) ‘The EU Consti-
tution and Positions on Governance’, Paper presented at the workshop
‘Domestic Structures and Institution Building in the European Union’, ECPR
13–18 April 2004.
Pennings, Paul (2002) ‘The Dimensionality of the EU Policy Space: The European
Elections of 1999’, European Union Politics (1): 59–80.
Sibun, Penelope and Jeffrey Reynar (1996) ‘Language Identification: Examining
the Issues’, in Symposium on Document Analysis and Information Retrieval,
pp. 125–35, Las Vegas.
Thomson, Robert, Jovanka Boerefijn and Frans Stokman (2004) ‘Actor Alignments
in European Union Decision Making’, European Journal of Political Research 43:
237–61.
Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing
the European Communities and certain related acts (2001) Official Journal of the
European Communities, No. C 80, 10 March, p. 1.
About the authors
Kenneth Benoit is Lecturer in the Department of Political Science,
Trinity College, Dublin 2, Ireland.
Fax: +353 1 677 0546
E-mail: kbenoit@tcd.ie
Michael Laver is a Professor in the Department of Politics, New York
University, 726 Broadway, New York, NY 10003–9580, USA.
Fax: +1 212 995 4184
E-mail: ml127@nyu.edu
European Union Politics 6(3)3 1 2
03_benoit_054834 (jk-t)  13/7/05  2:15 pm  Page 312
Christine Arnold is a post-doctoral fellow in the Department of
Political Science, Vrije Universiteit, De Boelelaan 1081, 1081 HV
Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Fax: +31 20 5986820
E-mail: c.arnold@fsw.vu.nl
Paul Pennings is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political
Science, Vrije Universiteit, De Boelelaan 1081, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The
Netherlands.
Fax: +31 20 5986820
E-mail: pjm.pennings@fsw.vu.nl
Madeleine O. Hosli is an Associate Professor in the Department of
Political Science, Leiden University, PO Box 9555, 2300 RB Leiden, The
Netherlands.
Fax: +31 71 5273815
E-mail: hosli@fsw.leidenuniv.nl
Benoit, Laver, Arnold, Pennings and Hosli Measuring National Delegate Positions 3 1 3
03_benoit_054834 (jk-t)  13/7/05  2:15 pm  Page 313
